ABSTRACT: Public engagement in collaborative natural resource management necessitates perspective taking, shared understanding, and collaboration. There is currently little understanding about how to reliably generate perspective-taking and collaboration, particularly in situations involving the unequal distribution of resources. Here we examine how using a computer-mediated scenario to simulate resource gain and loss influenced individual perspective-taking and behavior. Participants (n=180) were randomly assigned to each condition: high resources, low resources, lose resources, gain resources. Multilevel analysis revealed that losing resources decreased perspective-taking and collaboration. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research for public engagement in environmental decisions.
INTRODUCTION
Natural resource management decisions are inherently difficult because they require input from multiple diverse groups with competing values and divergent interests (Brown & Harris, 2000; Jacobson & Decker, 2006) . Collaborative natural resource management by communities, or in partnership with government institutions, has had its share of failures. Ample evidence suggests that fragile social connections can hinder efforts to solve collective-action problems and contribute to collaborative resource failure (Acheson, 2006) . Egoistic behavior and failed collaborative management can result in a "Tragedy of the Commons" (Hardin, 1968) , where common pool resources (e.g., cod in New England, forests in Maine and water in the Southwest and Mexico) are depleted resulting in the subsequent collapse and closure of fisheries, the loss of forested habitat, and water shortages. According to theory, the key to transformative collaborative processes for natural resource management is to develop effective participatory processes that overcome divergent interests by building trust, commitment, and shared understanding among participants (Ansell & Gash, 2008) .
The common theoretical assumption is that the collaborative process can transform combative stakeholders into cooperative partners that contribute to resolving public goods management challenges (Ostrom, 2000) . According to theory, the collaborative process accomplishes this by enhancing shared understanding among participants, which then promotes collaborative behavior (Ansell & Gash, 2008) . Perspective-taking is commonly described as an important precursor of shared understanding (Buckles & Rusnak, 1999; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Ostrom, 2000) . Perspective-taking is a critical component of empathy and a facilitator of positive social interactions, such as collaboration. Defined as the ability to see situations through the eyes of others, perspective-taking facilitates social coordination, fosters social bonds (Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005) and promotes helping behavior (Cialdiani, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997) .
Perspective-taking can be manipulated and stimulated using images or videos of people or animals being harmed (Batson, Change, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Berenguer, 2007; Schultz, 2000; Shelton & Rogers, 1981) . Methods to induce perspective-taking have included "manipulation of observational sets, manipulations of actual physiological arousal, manipulations of attributions regarding one's own arousal, similarity manipulations,…and empathic mood inductions" (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p.93) . Picture/story procedures were originally designed to measure empathy in young children (Feshbach & Roe, 1968) . 1 Studies have shown that messages triggering an empathic reaction can increase willingness to help abused children (Bagozzi & Moore, 1994) , enhance the persuasiveness of a health risk communication campaign and the adoption of risk avoidance behaviors (Campbell & Babrow, 2004) , and increase helping behavior (Batson, 1994; Cialdiani et al., 1997) . In a recent study, Shen (2011) found that messages designed to arouse a perspective-taking response were more effective than fear-arousing ones because they inhibited reactance to the persuasive message. When a simulated resource-sharing exercise was framed as a cooperative exercise with shared goals and interests, perspective-taking led to collaborative behavior among participants (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006) .
However, despite evidence that persuasive messages and simulations can arouse perspective-taking and the well-established conceptual basis for the relationship between 1 It is important to note that extensive research on empathy and prosocial behavior has been conducted with children. Because our intervention addresses collaboration between adults, we have not described this research in-depth. However, we are familiar with this line of research that suggests that modeling, positive reinforcement and empathic arousal can promote prosocial behavior among children (e.g., Eisenberg & Mussen 1989; Eisenberg et al., 2006; Hastings, Utendale & Sullivan 2007) . Unfortunately, these results have been mixed and inconclusive, which has contributed to additional gaps in current understanding of how to effectively enhance prosocial behavior.
perspective-taking and collaborative behavior (Berenger, 2007 (Berenger, , 2008 Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Galinsky et al., 2005) , it is still unclear how to reliably arouse the perspective-taking of diverse collaborators to promote prosocial behavior for collaborative resource-based conservation. While evidence suggests that asking participants to consider the perspective of others can increase helping behavior (Batson, 1994; Cialdiani et al., 1997) , alternative research suggests that within a simulated resource sharing exercise, perspective-taking can lead to reactive egoism (i.e., where expectations of self-serving behavior by others can contribute to egoistic behavior among participants) (Epley et al., 2006) . Efforts to engender perspectivetaking and prosocial behavior are a critical component of sustainable resource management, but our understanding of how to encourage these variables in the context of natural resource dilemmas and in cases involving inequalities in starting resource power or control is confused at best (Acheson, 2006) .
Following this line of thinking, this research tests whether a computer simulation, focused on the collaborative management of water resources in the Southwestern United States, can arouse individual perspective-taking and encourage collaborative behavior. Perspective-taking and collaborative behavior are measured over the course of two rounds of a simulated threshold public goods experiment. Since natural resource collaborations often involve groups with disparate access to and control over resources, we also explore how differences in starting and ending resource levels influence participants' perspective-taking scores and collaborative behavior. This paper begins by reviewing the relevant literature and developing testable hypotheses. The successive sections report on a test of the hypotheses using a series of multilevel models. The article ends with implications for research and practice.
BACKGROUND

Empathic Perspective-taking
Empathy is "the process(es) whereby one person can come to know the internal state of another and be motivated to respond with sensitive care" (Batson, Ahmad, & Lishner, 2011, p.11) . While the full array of empathy can involve multiple components, key among these factors is the skill of perspective-taking, also called empathic perspective-taking (Preston & De Waal, 2002) . Perspective-taking allows us to imagine what a character in a movie is feeling or to imagine what it feels like to walk in someone else's shoes. "To be considerate, even in small ways, one needs empathic perspective-taking" (De Waal, 2009, p. 110) .
Two important components of perspective-taking play a critical role in promoting collaborative behavior: individual perspective-taking (the cognitive process of imagining the experiences of another) and macro perspective-taking, which includes the social, political, and economic context for the social realities of the lives of other people (Segal, Wagaman, & Gerdes, 2012) . Individual perspective-taking facilitates social bonds with new groups or individuals (Galinsky et al., 2005) . Individual perspective-taking is the foundation on which the macro perspective-taking components can be developed . Macro perspective takers are interested in understanding why people are poor, understanding the political perspectives or opinions of people who are different from them, and helping people of a different race or ethnicity. Both types of perspective-taking are key in decreasing prejudice, facilitating social coordination (Galinsky et al., 2005) , and improving intergroup attitudes and relationships (Batson et al., 1997) . Without individual perspective-taking, a person is not able to have macro perspective-taking. Both individual and macro perspective-taking skills are individual-level factors that could influence an individual's ability and willingness to collaborate.
Previous studies using picture/story measures to arouse perspective-taking have found no connection between empathy and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) . In addition, most of these measures focus primarily on an affective response to another's emotion rather than a cognitive or perspective-taking response. Questionnaire measures of empathy have previously been used to infer a relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior (see Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972 -scale of emotional tendency; Stotland et al., 1978 -FantasyEmpathy Scale; and Davis, 1980 and Davis, , 1983a and Davis, , 1983b . Previous research using survey measures have found a significant relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) . Eisenberg and Miller (1987) suggest that surveys are a more appropriate measure of the relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior than picture/story measures because they measure multiple items and situations and are generally designed to distinguish between the affective and cognitive components of empathy and specifically tap perspective-taking. The survey instrument we will use for this research, the Social Empathy Index (SEI), was developed by PI Segal and has been previously validated, tested and theoretically supported (Segal, 2011; Gerdes, Lietz, & Segal, 2011a; Segal, 2012; Segal et al., 2012) . The instrument has two perspective-taking components: a micro (interpersonal) and a macro (social) making it an excellent measure to use to assess perspective-taking.
Perspective-taking and Prosocial Behavior
Within our research, we treat perspective-taking as it has historically been treated in the psychological literature, as a vital and instrumental determinant of successful prosocial behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) . There is strong theoretical and empirical support for the connection between perspective-taking and socially responsible behavior (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 2000; Segal et al., 2012) . Broadly, empathy can improve intergroup attitudes and relations (Batson et al., 1997; Stephan & Finlay, 1999) , promote social interaction (Gerdes & Segal, 2009) , civic engagement (Miaskiewicz & Monarchia, 2008) , and social tolerance . More specifically, perspective-taking can increase social competence, generate a sense of psychological closeness between individuals, encourage helping behavior (Cialdini et al., 1997; Davis, 1983a) , and increase mimicking behavior, which enhances coordinated interactions and prosocial behavior between individuals (Müller, 2012; van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009) .
Collaborative behaviors are included in the broad domain of prosocial behaviors, which include voluntary or intentional actions aimed at enhancing outcomes for others and for oneself (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) . Collaborative management of natural resources is a subtype of prosocial behavior. Prosocial action (i.e., collaboration over natural resources) can be motivated by altruism -where the actor performed the behavior with no expectation of personal benefit. The Batson Model of Altruistic and Prosocial Behavior (Batson, 1991) has conceptually linked empathy with altruistic motivations and prosocial behavior. In addition to altruistic motivation, non-altruistic actions can generate collaboration in an effort to avoid punishment or to benefit only oneself.
Collaboration is also described as "a process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible" (Gray, 1989, p. 5) . Collaborative outcomes are often attributed to the successful development of trust, commitment, and understanding within the collaborative process (Ansell & Gash, 2008 ; Figure 1 ). There are few empirical studies, however, evaluating the individual boundary conditions (factors of the person) that may prevent or encourage commitment to the process, social trust or shared understanding that could facilitate prosocial action. Yet while individuals who are capable of taking the perspective of other people may be better at considering other's concerns and more likely to try to see the world through the eyes of another, this may not always lead to collaborative behavior. Given that people generally believe they are more principled and trustworthy than others (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Epley & Dunning, 2000) and assume others are egocentric and generally overemphasize the consequence of selfishness on other's attitudes (Miller, 1999) , higher perspective-taking ability may ironically contribute to greater mistrust, doubt and reduced cooperative behavior among individuals prompted to take the perspective of others. 
Power/control and collaborative behavior
In their review of 137 cases of collaborative governance, Ansell & Gash (2008) described institutional design (i.e., participatory inclusiveness, clear ground rules, process transparency and forum exclusiveness), starting conditions (i.e., power-resource-knowledge asymmetries, incentives for and constraints on participation, and prehistory of cooperation or conflict), and facilitative leadership as external factors that "set the basic level of trust, conflict, and social capital that become resources or liabilities during collaboration" (p. 550) (Figure 1 ). Power, particularly perceived social power, is an important starting condition of collaboration that can also influence perspective-taking. Within collaborative natural resource management, power is the ability to control resources and influence decision-making (Fiske, 1993; Reed, 2008) . Disparities in power, ubiquitous in real world governance challenges, are described as key barriers to meaningful collaboration because such disparities prevent less powerful stakeholders from participating in the decision-making process (Ansell & Gash, 2008) . Powerful players can dominate the collaborative process or take self-interested action that excludes important stakeholders and thwarts collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Leach, 2006; Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, 2002; Purdy, 2012) . When resources are scarce and distributed unequally, collaborative processes are more prone to manipulation by powerful stakeholders (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Leach, 2006) . However, power is believed to both increase and decrease empathic accuracy (Côté et al., 2011) and reduce the ability to understand others' thoughts, feelings and point of view (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi & Gruenfeld, 2006) .
Perceived power over resources can also influence incentives to participate in and collaborate during collaborative decision-making processes (Imperial 2005) . As the eminent political scientist Robert Dahl noted in 1957, power and its definition are context dependent and complicated. By asking participants to share resources for the collective good, the collaborative process effectively shifts resource control and power dynamics (e.g., losing or gaining resources, access to resources, etc.; Ostrom, 2011); therefore, power dynamics can influence both the starting conditions of a collaboration, interactions within the collaborative process, and collaborative outcomes. Despite the theoretical significance of social power within collaborative resource management, there is little to no empirical evidence about how this critical component influences perspective-taking during the collaborative process. There is currently no comprehensive framework on power in collaborative settings (Huxham & Vangen, 2005) and minimal empirical data on how individuals and groups respond to asymmetric power dynamics within collaboration (Ostrom, 2011) .
In this study we test existing models of collaborative decision-making for natural resource management by evaluating hypotheses about the relationship between perspectivetaking and collaborative outcomes and what happens to this relationship when participants start and end with asymmetrical levels of resource control (power). Our purpose is to develop a new framework for collaborative decision-making that includes both contextual and individual influences as starting conditions affecting the collaborative process (Figure 2 ). The framework assumes that institutional design (i.e., participatory inclusiveness, clear ground rules, process transparency and forum exclusiveness), facilitative leadership and additional starting conditions (i.e., incentives for and constraints on participation, and prehistory of cooperation or conflict) are also important predictors of collaborative outcomes, but in this analysis, we control these factors and focus instead on the relationships between power, perspective-taking and collaboration. We tested our hypotheses by measuring perspective-taking and collaborative behavior before and after participation in a computer simulated threshold public goods experiment. Each experiment included multiple rounds of a variation of a threshold public goods experiment where personal resources are risked for positive collective outcomes. Collective action problems, such as the joint management of natural resources, have traditionally been described as social dilemmas and have been modeled experimentally using prisoner's dilemma games and public goods experiments (Ostrom, 2000) . The treatment version of this experiment was designed to arouse perspective-taking, therefore, we expect to see an increase in perspective-taking scores among the treatment groups. However, we also expect to see an interaction between power and perspective-taking. We propose that gaining resources will make players feel more powerful, which will result in lower posttest perspective-taking scores after the simulation.
H1: Participants from groups that gain resources (start low | end high) will report lower posttest perspective-taking scores than groups that lost resources (start high | end low) or maintained the same resource level.
Given the theoretical connection between perspective-taking and prosocial behavior, if shifting power dynamics result in lower posttest perspective-taking scores, they should also result in reduced collaborative behavior. We expect this relationship to be particularly important for groups that gained resources during the collaborative situation. There are conflicting examples of elevated social power levels encouraging increased cooperation (Galinsky et al., 2006) and interacting with social orientations that promote selfishness (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001) . There are few examples of research exploring the connection between power and collaborative behavior; however, in a recent example, researchers found that increasing player wealth within a rigged Monopoly game (i.e., twice the starting paper money, additional dice, and additional resources throughout the game, such as a higher bonus for passing go) led to displays of dominance and aggression among the powerful players (Piff, 2013 ). While we believe that gaining resources within a collaborative process will encourage egoistic behavior, we believe that losing resources will encourage participants to imagine what it feels like to walk in someone else's shoes and result in increased perspective-taking and collaborative behavior. We therefore predicted that elevated power levels would reduce perspective-taking scores.
H2: Groups that gain resources (start low | end high) will contribute less than groups that lost resources or maintained the same resource level.
METHOD
Computer simulation
In 2012, we developed a design artifact called Your Future Phoenix. This artifact was designed as a complement to the WaterSim model, developed by the National Science Foundationsupported Decision Center for a Desert City (Gober, Wentz, Lant, Tschudi, & Kirkwood, 2011; Sampson, Escobar, Tschudi, Lant, & Gober, 2011) . WaterSim is an interactive simulation model devised to help stakeholders deliberate on and explore the consequences of urban water planning decisions in central Arizona (Hu, Johnston, Hemphill, Krishnamurthy, & Vinze, 2012) . The artifact was developed to allow a) robust and reliable data capture, b) multiple simultaneous participation of hundreds of participants both individually and in teams, c) the flexibility to modularly modify scenarios with minimal overhead, and d) open resource sharing of theory, datasets and models. We chose a gamification approach to handle our complex realworld scenarios and to improve the user experience and engagement (Detarding, Sicart, Nacke, O'Hara, & Dixon, 2011) . The game modules were designed as independent and reconfigurable modules, allowing us to add and remove new scenarios or combinations of scenarios easily.
2 In 2013, we evaluated Your Future Phoenix, using pilot experiments to verify the accuracy of the database and logging service, data collection efficiency, and human-centered design requirements. Using field tests, we verified the accuracy of the player events as they are captured through the logging service and data persistence.
Survey
Before and after participating in the simulation, players were asked to complete a survey. The survey instrument, the Social Empathy Index (SEI), assesses levels of empathy influenced by cultural differences, social situations, and political and economic conditions (Gerdes, Segal, Jackson, & Mullins, 2011b; Lietz et al., 2011; Segal et al., 2012) and has been previously validated, tested and theoretically supported (Gerdes et al., 2011a; Segal, 2011; Segal, 2012; Segal et al., 2012) . The SEI includes 22 items measuring interpersonal empathy, including five perspective-taking items and an additional seven items addressing two macro components of empathy, including macro self-other awareness/perspective-taking. To minimize social desirability effects, the instrument is titled "Human Relations Survey." Responses range from 1 (never) to 6 (always).
Participants
Undergraduate and graduate students from a public university in the Southwestern United States were recruited as participants for course credit (n=180). Participants were randomly assigned to groups (start high resource or start low resource) that were nested within classes and then the classes were randomly assigned to treatment or control conditions (Figure 4) . The experiment was based on a between-participants design with four conditions: control conditions with either high resource groups (start high | end high) or low resource groups (start 2 To develop the scenarios, we used Microsoft's C# programming language and MVC framework, which allowed a simulation that provides real-life experiences to game participants. We used software libraries such as JQuery, HTML5, allowing for asynchronous users. low | end low) that stay the same and treatment conditions with groups that lose resources (start high | end low) or gain resources (start low | end high). Groups were composed of 2-5 players.
Fig. 3. Group Starting and Ending Resource Conditions in the 'Joint Reservoir Project'
Design and treatment
The focus of this natural resource management experiment was joint decisions about water use and management. The intervention began with information about water use in the Phoenix metropolitan area. Both treatment and control classes played the first round of the simulation in the same way. Groups that started with higher resources were told that they represented the city of Phoenix and had a total of 100 water units to allocate. Groups starting with lower resources were informed that they represented the city of Surprise and had a total of 70 water units to allocate (see Figure 3) . In the first exercise, players were asked to allocate city resources (water units) across five water categories: residential, industrial, agricultural, urban development, and environmental. Players did this first as individuals and then as members of their assigned groups/cities (Phoenix or Surprise). Next, players were asked to donate city-owned water resources to support the development of a collaborative water project between the cities of Phoenix and Surprise (the 'Joint Reservoir Project'). Participants were told that the water stored in the Joint Reservoir Project would be used to sustain residential and city services in drought years. A minimum joint contribution of 120 water units was required to establish the reservoir (the threshold) that would benefit all the groups by increasing their overall water budgets in future years. Successful groups, those that reached the threshold, doubled the contributions available for future use. Groups that failed to reach the threshold lost their individual contributions. Groups were encouraged to discuss their decisions within their groups, but not with other groups. Pairs of Phoenix and Surprise teams were intentionally dispersed widely so that they could not interact during the deliberation. All groups submitted their contributions at the same time. The simulation disclosed the results only after all of the groups had submitted their decisions. After completing one round of the threshold public goods game, participants were asked to disclose whether their groups were successful or not.
Prior to round two, treatment classes were told that they would swap cities in the next round: representatives of Phoenix would move to Surprise and lose resource (water) units (start high | end low) and representatives of Surprise would move to Phoenix and gain water units (start low | end high). While water units changed, group composition, location in the room and membership did not. Control classes remained in the same low resource (start low | end low) and high resource (start high | end high) groups to play the second round (see Figure 3) .
Fig. 4. Diagram of Multilevel Model of Subjects Within Groups
Group contribution (Group-level measure)
Group contribution was measured as the total number of water units contributed in the threshold public goods game (the Joint Reservoir Project) (range 0-120) during the two rounds of play (time 1 and time 2). Because starting resource units (i.e., 70 or 100) varied between groups, we transformed all of the contribution amounts by dividing the responses by the total resource units available at the start of each round. The original dataset included a single contribution level for every player; since this value was the same across groups, we collapsed this item into a single group value.
Treatment Groups
Control Groups 
Analysis
Perspective-taking items (5 individual and 7 macro) were tested for reliability using Cronbach's a and item analysis; a >.70 was considered acceptable (Nunnally, 1978; Vaske, 2008) . We used SAS v9.4 to conduct two three-level models (model 1A and model 1B) to explore how group starting and ending resource levels influenced individual and macro perspective-taking. Individual and macro perspective-taking were the outcome variables for model 1A and model 1B, respectively. We also ran one two-level model (model 2) to explore how group starting and ending power levels influenced group contribution. Group contribution was the outcome variable in model 2. All of the models included time as a repeated measure. Across all of the models, group membership was the top-level experimental unit of the model (2 or 3; see Figure 4 ) and start resources and end resources were included as fixed factors at the group level. All models were estimated via the restricted maximum likelihood (RML) procedure. The criterion for statistical significance was p< 0.05.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four possible resource combinations: eleven start high | end high, start low | end low control groups (n=22) and eight start high | end low and start low | end high treatment groups (n=16). Participants were more likely to be female (54%) than male (46%) and the average age was 22. Most of the respondents described their race or ethnicity as Caucasian (54%) followed by Hispanic (15%), Asian (9%), and African American (4%) participants. Participants indicated 21 distinct academic majors, including public policy and administration (18%), criminology (10%), health and medicine (9%), business (8%) and communication (7%). 
Linear Mixed Models Results
Mean scores for perspective-taking and contribution for all combinations of group start resource and end resource levels suggest that group responses varied between time 1 and time 2 (Table 1) . Hypothesis 1 proposed that shifting resource levels would reduce perspectivetaking; specifically, participants from groups that gained resources would report lower perspective-taking scores after the simulation compared to groups that lost resources or stayed the same. We tested this hypothesis by fitting two 3-level models with the same fixed effects Table 2 ). Our subjects were students and the dependent variables were individual perspective-taking scores (model 1A) and macro perspective-taking scores (model 1B). There was a significant effect of StartRes*EndRes on individual perspective-taking. There were no differences in perspective-taking at time 1. At time 2, the low resource control groups had higher scores on perspective-taking than the treatment groups that lost resources (see Table 1 ) Estimate(SE)=0.514(0.159); t(DF)=61.64(3,23), p=0.002. There were no significant fixed effects of starting resources, ending resources or time on macro perspective-taking. Hypothesis 2 predicted that treatment group participants who gained resources would decrease their contribution from round 1 to round 2. We tested this effect by fitting a 2-level model with start resources and end resources as group-level covariates, time as a within-group factor and contribution as the dependent variable (Table 3 ). There was a significant effect of StartRes*EndRes on group contribution. There were no significant differences between the groups at time 1; however, at time 2, there were significant differences in contribution between the control groups and the treatment groups that lost resources. Low resource control groups contributed more at time 2 than the treatment groups that lost resources Estimate(SE)=0.247(0.106); t(DF)=2.34(21.91), p=.0290. The treatment groups that lost resources contributed less at time 2 than the high resource control groups Estimate(SE)=-0.213(0.092); t(DF)=-2.32(13.68), p=.0364.
As expected, perspective-taking scores and collaborative behavior changed as a result of participation in the CM simulation. However, instead of an increase in posttest perspectivetaking scores in treatment groups that lost resources (start high | end low), these groups reported lower perspective-taking scores compared to control groups that maintained the same resource level. Additionally, treatment groups that lost resources (start high | end low) contributed less than groups that maintained the same resource level. Thus, these findings suggest that our CM simulation influenced perspective-taking and collaboration, but did not support the direction of our hypotheses. Instead of improving perspective-taking and collaboration, our simulation reduced these important variables. In the following section, we discuss some potential explanations for these results and implications for public engagement in collaborative natural resource management decisions.
CONCLUSION
Public engagement in natural resource management decisions will require the use of communication tools that build trust and shared understanding among diverse groups with disparate perspectives and different levels of resource control. This research explored whether a computer simulation could be used to influence perspective-taking and encourage collaborative action and how resource asymmetries during the collaborative process influence decision-making within the context of a resource-sharing dilemma.
Hypothesis 1 proposed that participants in groups that gained resources would report lower perspective-taking scores than groups that lost resources or maintained the same resource level during the computer simulation. This hypothesis was not supported by the data. Despite designing a computer simulation to promote perspective-taking, participants in the perspective-taking condition reported decreased perspective-taking scores over time. Differences in individual perspective-taking scores were observed between groups that lost resources and groups that maintained the same resource level.
The observed correlation between lower perspective-taking scores and reduced donations to the collaborative threshold public goods game provided support for the theoretical relationship between perspective-taking and collaborative behavior. However, the results did not support the direction of Hypothesis 2. Increased control over resources did not lead to more egoistic behavior; instead, loss of resources significantly decreased contributions at time 2.
In previous experiments involving simulated resource allocation negotiations, Epley et al. (2006) reported that perspective-taking within competitive interactions contributed to a focus on other players' concerns and interests, which increased egoistic (selfish) behavior and led to resource taking instead of sharing. Epley et al. (2006) also found that the impact of perspective-taking on behavior was moderated by the conditions of the interaction: cooperative conditions where participants had shared interests did not generate the same reactive egoistic behavior in response to a perspective-taking prompt. The simulation used for this research (the 'Joint Reserve Project') was designed as a collaborative perspective-taking simulation. Participants who successfully collaborated in the threshold public goods game were rewarded with equal resources, regardless of what they initially contributed. Given the collaborative nature of our simulations, we were expecting the perspective-taking condition to prevent egoistic behavior. The observed egoistic behavior among groups that lost resources was unanticipated. In the following paragraphs, we explore alternative reasons why our data failed to support our hypotheses.
Communication is a key predictor of the success and efficiency of collaborative management and collective action (Ostrom, 2000) to conserve a common resource pool (e.g., Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981; Ostrom & Walker, 1991) . Communication can promote norms that encourage cooperation and facilitate the development of group identity that can motivate prosocial action (Ostrom & Walker, 1991) . It is possible that the climate of communication, defined as "an atmosphere within a team characterized by open, supportive communication, speaking up, and risk taking" (Gibson & Gibbs, 2006, p. 456) shifted after treatment participants experienced the perspective-taking condition. The dynamic structural arrangements and shifting rules may have reduced trust and process predictability, which prevented risk taking activities (e.g., a larger contribution at time 2). Changes in the structure of the game and the rules (e.g., asking participants to swap roles) may have shifted the climate from a psychologically safe space where participants were willing to share opinions, respect other's ideas and perspectives, and take calculated risks (Edmondson, 1999) to a climate that created uncertainty, fear of failure, and heightened perceptions of risk, which reduced participant prosocial behavior in the second round. Uncertainty about whether potentially significant or disappointing outcomes of decisions will be realized can contribute to greater perceptions of risk and can make management goals and objectives more difficult to achieve (Johnston et al., 2011; Sitkin & Pablo, 1992) . Since both treatment groups experienced a shift in the game and the rules but only the groups that lost resources (start high | end low) exhibited egoistic behavior, this alternative explanation seems unlikely.
Ostrom (2000) described a number of factors that influence contributions to a public good that might have affected our experimental results, including the framing of the situation and communication between participants. Framing within public good experiments influences participant behavior (see Andreoni, 1995; Elliot, Hayward, & Canon, 1998; Cookson, 2000; Park, 2000; Pruitt 1967 Pruitt , 1970 Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999) . Frames that emphasize teamwork can increase cooperation (Sonnemans, Schram, & Offerman, 1998) . Positive framing, emphasizing that a contribution will have a public good, and a positive benefit for other participants, has been found to generate more prosocial behavior than framing a contribution as a prevention of a public bad, which will make the other subjects worse off (Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999) . Subjects consistently contribute more under positive framing conditions than negative ones. However, additional research has suggested this gap occurs only within a repetitive game (Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999) . Other researchers have suggested that it is not necessarily the perception of public good that induces greater collaboration but perceptions of other players' contributions that drive this response (Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 1999) . Beliefs about other players' potential contributions can generate normative concerns about fairness and reciprocity that encourage an individual to contribute or defect (Dawes et al., 1977; Rege & Telle, 2004) . "If the framing of the public good game makes a person more optimistic about other people's adherence to a norm for cooperation, then his dominant strategy may no longer be to defect" (Rege & Telle, 2004 , p.1631 . It is possible that shifting roles shifted treatment group player perceptions from collaborative to competitive. Although in this case, we would have expected to see egoistic behavior in both the lose resource and gain resource treatment groups.
The small number of groups used in this research may have, in some cases, reduced our ability to see a significant effect. Nonetheless, the results indicated an important predictive relationship between perspective-taking and collaborative behavior that has been observed in other studies and contexts. Also, this study explored these relationships with undergraduate and graduate students who may differ from the general public in ways that limit the generalizability of this research. Future research should explore these relationships with representative samples of the public or natural resource interest groups. These observations were made after only one treatment or swap resources round. Future research should also explore whether the observed relationships are seen in a repetitive game with multiple rounds.
Implications for Theory and Practice
Disparities in control over resources and decision-making influence are ubiquitous in realworld governance challenges. The common theoretical assumption is that collaborative natural resource processes can overcome these inequalities in power by generating perspective-taking, which promotes shared understanding and leads to prosocial behaviors (i.e., collaborative outcomes). Existing interventions that try to generate perspective-taking, focus primarily on the affective (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2003) and psychological aspect of perspective-taking (Gerdes, Segal & Lietz, 2010) . In this research, we were interested in perspective-taking that encourages the behavioral adoption of empathic action (Segal, 2011) . Our results suggest that this type of perspective-taking may be difficult to generate reliably and sustainably. Future steps should include the development and testing of additional approaches to arouse perspective-taking and collaborative behavior.
Previous research has suggested that perspective-taking can, in some cases, lead to egoistic behavior, as it did in this study. Our results add to the growing body of evidence that identify perspective-taking as a significant and important precursor of prosocial behavior. Moreover, our findings suggest that both the arousal and attenuation of perspective-taking can generate egoistic behavior.
Finally, our results have important implications for collaborative processes, which ask participants to share resources, decision-making authority, or power for the collective good. Current models of collaborative resource management that ignore the role of power within the collaborative process may be missing key information about the effect of starting resource control and shifting resource control on the relationship between perspective-taking and prosocial behavior. If powerful participants react to the loss of resources, control, or power by turning away from others, becoming less empathic, and more selfish, it suggests that power is not only a starting condition required for collaboration but also an important factor contributing to whether collaborative processes result in shared understanding or collaborative failure.
